The advantages of such approaches are clear. On the face of it they offer moral justifications and structural mechanisms for conserving resources through denying or restricting health care to some in order to optimise its benefit to others. Surely, allowing waste and inefficiency in the face of scarcity in health care is morally repugnant, as is the undemocratic refusal to allow the public to decide how limited resources should be distributed. Variations of such arguments are popular among healthcare managers and suggest practical and "hard headed" solutions to the problem of rationing health care. Unfortunately, such strategies can also lead to health care being denied to those in need. In this paper, an alternative moral theory of rationing health care is offered. It will be argued that rationing primarily based on criteria of cost effectiveness and public participation is unfair. This is because such criteria are inconsistent with the principle that all humans should have equal rights of access to health care on the basis of equal needs. A more equitable, although still practically feasible, system of rationing will be developed, one in which cost effectiveness and public participation will still have an important role. To simplify the argument, our focus will be on the central funding of hospital care only and on rationing within the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom. The conclusions drawn will, however, be applicable to centrally funded health care in other countries.
Should cost effectiveness or public participation or both determine who gets what? Within centrally funded health care, the effectiveness of purchasing -however this may be nationally or locally organised -is often equated with the utilitarian goal of maximising the greatest health gain for the most people. The measure usually proposed as a means of achieving this aim is some variation on the quality adjusted life year (QALY) .' On the face of it, the aim of QALYs is laudable as they offer an apparently objective comparative indicator for the health gain derived from different types of clinical treatments.
QALYs are constructed through the initial correlation of particular treatments with evidence of their impact on mortality and morbidity (defined, for example, in relation to mobility and pain). Different treatments will be associated with different values of these variables -some treatments doing well on all counts, others on only a few, and some scoring poor results altogether. Once this quantitative information is obtained, the task then becomes to rank the treatments in order of the increased or decreased quality of life which each cluster of scores represents. This is usually done through asking respondents to compare their preferences for different combinations -so much life expectancy with so much pain or so much loss of mobility, for example -with being in a state of perfect health. The values which these preferences show can then be averaged and used to rank the quality of life associated with the cluster of mortality and morbidity scores for each treatment.
In this way, a value can be given to the health gain of each treatment. This value can then be set against the average price of each treatment Doyal to produce a ratio of cost and effectiveness. If the aim is primarily to maximise health gain as defined by QALYs with the most effective use of scarce resources, treatments can then be funded in the order which offers the greatest potential gain. "League tables" of conditions matched to treatments can then be constructed in the order in which they should be purchased.2 For example, with similar techniques, studies have scored hip replacements and pacemaker insertions as better value than home or hospital haemodialysis or kidney transplantation.
The indicators of the effectiveness of health care which form a part of QALY calculations are potentially useful, despite some well rehearsed methodological problems. It obviously makes sense to avoid wasting scarce healthcare resources and there is clearly a need for objective criteria of cost effectiveness. However, the problem of equity emerges as soon as it is suggested that QALYs should be the prime determinant of the levels at which particular treatments are funded or even whether or not some treatments should be resourced at all.' ' Immediately, many of our intuitions about justice and fairness are challenged.
For example, if health gain is primarily defined as the potential for extra years lived, will we not always obtain greater value for money through spending it on younger patients rather than on older patients with curtailed life expectancies? Why not, therefore, drastically reduce health care for elderly people? Similarly, if the focus of health gain is on value for money in increasing mobility and decreasing pain then why not make similar reductions in spending on patients requiring expensive treatment who have debilitating chronic illnesses? Indeed, it would be consistent to argue on these grounds alone that we should allow the 1 0% of patients who are most sick in all categories to die so that we could use the freed resources more efficiently on the 90% who are less sick!5 Such suggestions make us morally recoil but we cannot explain why, if we believe that issues about healthcare rationing can be settled by simple reference to criteria of cost effectiveness, however these may be defined.
In theory, the general public is sometimes appealed to for help with such difficult moral choices. We have seen that traditional formulations of QALYs link cost effectiveness of treatments to a further measure -the ranking by the public of the relative quality of life which they can produce. QALYs aside, it is certainly fashionable to emphasise the moral importance of wider public participation in decision making about rationing health care.6 However, there is no reason to believe that local democracy of whatever kind can satisfactorily resolve major moral dilemmas about resource allocation.
Research on the representativeness and rationality of public consultation has shown serious problems in discovering what most people actually believe.' Much will depend on where and when consultation occurs, who speaks, and the terms of reference of the meetings -often completely arbitrary factors. provided Medicaid. This is often cited in support of the feasibility of such strategies in rationing medical care. Yet after the first initial consultation, it became clear that some intuitions about treatment priorities endorsed by the public were not subsequently reflected in the decision making of the health professionals running the consultation exercise."
As one well known commentator has argued: "There is no reason to believe that a different set of commissioners, reacting to the same community meeting process, would have arrived at a similar ranking of services".12
Health authorities in the United Kingdom have ignored local opinion in similar circumstances.'0 These experiences of conflicting moral intuitions suggest that in the face of dramatic scarcity, criteria of cost effectiveness might well be used to discriminate against minorities whose treatments are expensive and offer only slight increases in life expectancy and decreases in morbidity. Indeed, it can be argued that some traditional research into QALYs themselves falls into this category when evaluations of the cost effectiveness of treatments are derived from interviews with people representing the majority who are not seriously or chronically ill. The fact that the wider public might sometimes agree with or initiate such discrimination against minorities undermines arguments for giving it a decisive role in the distribution of healthcare resources. If we have learned anything from recent history it is that the best interests of minorities are not necessarily safe in the hands of majorities. This is of particular concern if the minority in question consists of those too vulnerable through illness to defend themselves.
If neither cost effectiveness nor public participation can ensure justice in the distribution of health care, on what theoretical and practical bases should it take place?
Why is there an equal right to health care based on equal need? The discussion thus far has relied heavily on moral intuition. We have argued against regarding cost effectiveness or democratic endorsement, or both, as acceptable criteria for rationing health care. Yet this scepticism is based on the prior belief that individuals should have equal access to health care on the basis of equal need -that the distribution of health care should be regarded as equitable in these terms. Supporters of centrally funded healthcare provision usually endorse some variation of this idea, arguing that necessary services should be free at the point of access. But can such ideas be founded on more than moral intuition, recognising that such intuitions may wildly differ? The answer is "yes" as can be shown through an analysis of the links between our need for good health and the moral duties which others expect of us and we expect of ourselves. Yet to say that someone "ought" to do something implies that they "can" do it. If we believe that others should do their best to do what is right -to be a good citizen in the terms defined by our culture -then it follows that they must be physically and mentally able to do so. This point applies equally to our moral expectations of ourselves. We cannot realise our potential to be good citizens in the eyes of others if we are physically and mentally disabled in ways which could be corrected. This will be true in all cultures and for all people who morally identify with them. '4 It logically follows that if we wish to impute moral duties to others then we have no option but to accept that they have the right to appropriate health care to enable them to do their best to be good citizens as we define it, always assuming that we really wish them to be so. And the same applies to others with respect to us. If they wish us to do our best to accept and act on the duties which they morally endorse then they must also respect our right to such care. In this sense, duties and rights go hand in hand. This is not just because they are usually correlated in practice but because without rights, duties are little more than moral abstractions. WHY In reality, of course, those deprived of the wherewithal to act as good citizens are still expected to strive to do so and are condemned when they do not. This has resulted in the creation of a disenfranchised minority with little personal stake in the moral aspirations of the majority.'6 Thus even if members of the majority choose irrationally to discount the equal right of everyone to health care, it is hardly prudent for them to do so in practice.
Although it may be possible to defend themselves against the most obvious expression of the minority's moral alientation -crime and other forms of asocial behaviour -total protection will be impossible.
It is because of the explicit or implicit recognition of arguments like the above that moral intuitions often suggest there is something morally adrift with purely utilitarian criteria for rationing health care. A narrow focus on either cost effectiveness or public acceptability in the rationing of health care can lead to people being denied a necessary condition for becoming and remaining good citizens and as such from fulfilling whatever personal potential they may possess. Moreover, to the degree that we can see the possibility of ourselves being so denied then we will be uneasy about the injustice of distributing centrally funded health care in this way. Therefore, both reason and prudence dictate that people should have an equal right to appropriate health care based on need.
Respecting the right to health care in practice: procedural policies Those who defend more utilitarian approaches to resource allocation may well respond to the arguments outlined above by raising the general issue of practical feasibility.'7 The scarcity of healthcare resources is a fact of our social and political life, they will say. This means that some people cannot have as many of their needs met as others. Consequently, if we are to continue to respect the right of each person to equal access to appropriate health care on the basis of equal need then we must find a way to reconcile this right with the reality of scarcity -of not being able to meet everyone's needs. This can be done through rationing health care in conformity with seven procedural principles. The first step in the just allocation of health care should be an assessment of the needs of the local population. Given our focus on hospital care, "need" is defined here as the requirement for specific clinical intervention to avoid sustained and serious disability. At present, such "needs assessments" are based on various sets of data -extrapolations from previous patterns of clinical provision, national and local mortality and morbidity statistics, specially commissioned studies on specific types of health problems, along with evidence from action groups and other representatives of local populations. The accuracy of needs assessment is of great moral importance. Yet, as is widely agreed, it is difficult to attain. '8 In the unlikely event that the sum required for this total expenditure is equal to or less than the budget then there is no problem. However, in the real world of centrally funded health care, there is likely to be a significant gap leading to the inevitability of rationing. To make this an equitable process, the budget for each specialty must be reduced by the same proportion. Thus if healthcare provision really is morally driven by the principle of satisfying need and the total amount of money required is 20% less than the funds available then the allocation to each specialization must also be reduced by 20%. To do otherwise would be to accept that some people in equal need should not be given equal access to health care simply because of the type of need they have.
Centrally funded healthcare systems remain mixed in their commitment to providing this equality of access. For example, in the United Kingdom, the NHS continues to have an overarching commitment of this kind, funding expensive programmes of transplantation and cancer treatment, despite questionable QALY scores. However, against the background of public support, increasing numbers of health authorities have withdrawn or minimised local funding for in vitro fertilization, reversal of sterilization, and cosmetic surgery.'9 Yet it is well known that infertility can be both psychologically and socially disabling for some women and men.20 The same can be said for disfigurement requiring cosmetic surgery.
To the extent that our argument linking needs, rights, and duties is accepted then there is no acceptable moral justification for discrimination against particular types of treatment -against patients with specific clinical categories of disease and disability. Some illnesses will inevitably be more expensive to treat than others, and sometimes with less effect. Some will not find popularity with the public. Yet At the opposite end of the range of urgency are healthcare services which patients may want but which they do not need -"need" being again defined with reference to what is required for a person to optimise their potential for successful social interaction through minimising physical and mental disability. Preferences which are not associated with such requirements have no claim on healthcare resources. An example would be cosmetic surgery for a condition which is marginally distressing but in no way socially disabling. The moral cutting edge of any claim must be the serious and sustained disability that would ensue if it were not met.
That Yet assuming that they really are organised to prioritise those in greatest need, waiting lists can come close to performing this role. The randomisation is achieved because within populations for whom health care is usually provided, the time at which and the seriousness with which illness develops is to all intents and purposes a matter of chance. When we become ill, we are subject to what is sometimes called the "lottery of life." Acute illness, for example, is the sort of misfortune which could affect anyone and it is this severity -rather than any personal or social attribute of sufferers -which creates a morally similar entitlement to health care.26 This is of course not to suggest that the timing or extremity of illness is a completely random process. Some groups such as unskilled workers, those who are unemployed, or elderly people will experience higher levels of serious illness than others. Yet even here the distribution of illness between individual people in these groups is still random enough for waiting lists to be fair -provided that they are not discriminatory on other grounds.
Thus The link between the right to health care and its potential effectiveness can lead, however, to surprising and uncomfortable results. This is because even when treatment does relieve disability caused by illness, this is not enough in itself to justify a patient's moral right to it. The improvement must be sustained. Many patients may be able potentially to benefit from a variety of life saving treatments -some of which are highly expensive -without having the right to them. Within intensive care medicine, for example, it is often possible to keep unconscious patients alive a little longer who will still die in the very short term or might live to be so brain damaged that they will never be able to execute another human action. Similar dilemmas about non-treatment are common in the care of neonates and elderly people when there can be enormous pressure from relatives and the public to provide expensive although futile treatments.
Considerable progress has been made on the development of acceptable ethical and legal guidelines for not starting or for withdrawing lifesaving treatment.3" As part of the drive toward effective clinical audit and evidence based medicine, it is imperative that there is clarification of the grounds on which such decisions are and should be made. Otherwise, scarcity will again dictate that some treatments with sustained effectiveness remain unavailable or unjustifiably delayed for those who could benefit. ( 
5) LIFESTYLE SHOULD NOT DETERMINE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
It has become fashionable to suggest that one way of dealing with the shortage of healthcare resources is to deny them to patients whose deliberate actions are causally implicated in their illnesses. Should those who have sacrificed short term gratification to look after their health be given priority over those who have not? Arguments of this kind seem to be even stronger when a patient's lifestyle continues to compromise the effectiveness of available treatments. In a situation of abundant healthcare resources, we might not have to contemplate such discrimination. However, in the face of scarcity, we do have to consider whether or not it is morally justifiable.32
Arguments of this kind imply for instance that non-smokers should have priority over smokers in allocating treatment for vascular disease, including coronary bypass. Indeed, some clinicians have refused to offer bypass surgery to any smokers at all. 33 Equally, "individual responsibility" has been included in lists of rationing criteria drawn up by some health authorities and even national governments.34
Health professionals have no moral obligation to provide treatments which are futile. We have seen that to do so would be wrong in circumstances where the consequence might be to deny effective treatments to others who could benefit. Yet it would be equally wrong to assume that all people have the same ability to act in their own best interests and that they can be held equally responsible for self harm. There are a range of educational, psychological, and social factors which mean that such abilities can vary widely. The Rarely is enough known about patients to judge the degree of their control over lifestyle.
Under most circumstances, therefore, rationing on the basis of lifestyle cannot be morally justified and should not figure in funding strategies for health care. The moral eye should remain clearly on the ball of human need, always provided that proposed treatments are not futile and will relieve disability. The spectre of clinicans becoming judges of lifestyle opens up the possibility for a wide range of personal prejudice in the allocation of healthcare resources which it is in no one's interest to promote. One clinician might feel strongly about smokers, another about obesity, another about alcohol, another about dangerous sporting activity -the slippery slope seems endless and has no clear moral justification. Even if we assume that all of the principles discussed thus far are incorporated into the allocation policies of the funded, the just allocation of healthcare resources does not automatically follow. Just as the fairness of waiting lists can become distorted by vested clinical interest, the same triumph of contingency over reason can occur in the decisions of those responsible for interpreting how these policies should be put into practice.
Rules do not interpret themselves; they must be applied to particular problems after deliberation about their most appropriate interpretation. Healthcare planners should not be thought of as ciphers who can be absolved of responsibility to optimise the rationality of their own debates. Success or failure in formulating and acting on equitable funding policies will be a reflection of their collective commitment to achieve this goal.
Of course, health planners are constrained by a range of external factors over which they have no control. These can detract from, if not completely obscure, rational decision making. In the United Kingdom, for example, the government has imposed national guidelines setting targets for health service performance which may not accurately reflect the particular needs of local populations.37 Similarly, "internal markets" -with all their problems -are becoming more and more fashionable within centrally funded systems. Despite the rhetoric about the virtues of competition, the reality is that funders cannot escape their responsibilities to sustain the long term economic and Doval clinical viability of key healthcare providers whose services they "purchase". Yet the purchasing decisions required to do so may be congruent neither with the satisfaction of local patterns of need nor with criteria of competitiveness. Finally, as governments make little new money available to central funders, they have little freedom to increase service provision in general or to shift funds to meet newly discovered need."8
It is not just external factors which can lead to irrational policies and decisions. The internal organisation and membership of planning organisations can also distort rational deliberation and limit the equity of decision making. Sometimes patterns of political power within organisations act to reinforce policies which are linked more to the interests and obsessions of specific persons or groups than to equitable healthcare rationing.39 When there is a distorted pattern of expenditure which cannot be justified with respect to external constraints and does not reflect manifest local need, it can often be explained by the presence of a champion whose institutional power or dominating personality, or both, makes rational debate extremely difficult.
There is often little that funders can do about outside political pressures to make inequitable decisions about rationing. However, there is no excuse within such organizations for not exposing arguments about rationing and equity to critical scrutiny to root out factual error and logical inconsistency. Equally, there should be a commitment not to suppress ideas because of their unpopularity or their political origins. To facilitate such processes, funders should endorse a clear statement of policy concerning equity in purchasing to which all employees are expected to adhere in their work as well as defining the principles of rational communication which they should observe in so doing.
Equally, to minimise the possibility of irrationality at the level of local policy formation, standing national bodies should be created with the specific purpose of generating and reviewing policies of equitable healthcare rationing. 40 But what is sometimes underestimated is the degree of public commitment required to evaluate both existing and experimental treatments. Such research should be regarded as a form of public consultation which can at times make considerable demands on those who agree to participate. The same point applies to the larger numbers of people who are consulted in studies designed to assess the impact of strategies for health promotion. Evidence based health care would not be possible without the active involvement of members of the public and it is important to acknowledge their active contribution.44
Better defence ofpatients' rights There is more to the provision of a morally acceptable standard of health care than treatment or prevention which has been shown to be effective. Patients and the public are often just as concerned with the quality of the professional and personal relations within which health care is delivered. The upsurge of interest in and concern about ethical and legal issues in medicine is a reflection of this con In such circumstances, it is also the duty of planners both to consult the public and to aid and advise its representatives about the most appropriate and effective means of making their case. Again, without such consultation, the rationality of decision making -and therefore its moral status -will be compromised.
The public may not always be right. However, members of local communities possess a wealth of what can be termed experiential understanding which is crucial in trying to establish what is right.4' Equity and the national politics of resource allocation An assumption has been made throughout this discussion which is found in practically all of the literature on the ethics of resource allocation: that the pool of national resources available for health care is a more or less constant percentage of gross national product. It has been argued that if this were managed in conformity with the substantive and procedural moral principles outlined above, it could eliminate or reduce a proportion of physical and mental illness which remains untreated. However, if extra funding for health care can be found and similarly managed then a much greater proportion of needs could be met. This fact is too often ignored in debates about healthcare rationing.
Because of what is sometimes described as the infinite demand for health care, counterarguments maintain that increasing the percentage of gross national product on health care is a pointless gesture. Yet this conclusion is avoided once a clear distinction is made between objective needs and subjective preferences. We have seen that the fact that a patient wants, or a clinician prefers to 
